ON THE USE OF
AKKADIAN INFINITIVE AFTER "ŠA"
OR CONSTRUCT STATE

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I. NOMINALIZATION OF COMMAND, WISH, POTENTIALITY

The relative clause *ša īpušu* in an Akkadian sentence like
  bītum ša īpušu imqut "the house which he built fell down"
can be analysed as representing a finite sentence
  bītam īpuš "he built a house".
This process is called nominalization, because a sentence is thereby correlated to a noun phrase or its equivalent: in the example given, *bītam īpuš* is transformed into the relative clause *ša īpušu* which has the same syntactical role as an attribute or other similar noun phrase. The notion, if not the term, of nominalization[1] is well known to traditional grammar, for instance in the case of the subjective and objective genitive. A noun phrase of the type
  erišti šarrim "the king's request"
is accordingly explained as the equivalent of some such sentence as
  šarrum irriš "the king asks for",
i.e. the genitive *šarrim* is explained by resolving the noun phrase into a finite sentence where *šarrum* appears as the subject (hence the term "subjective genitive"). Conversely, a noun phrase of the type
  erišti kaspim "a request of silver"
is explained as the equivalent of
  kaspam irriš "he asks for silver",

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[1] On the notion of nominalization as applied to Akkadian, and in general on the method followed in this article, see my forthcoming book *A Structural Grammar of Babylonian*.

where *kaspam* occurs as the object (hence "objective genitive").[1]

The nominalization of a sentence with the verb in the indicative occurs regularly by introducing a relative pronoun and inflecting the verb in the subjunctive – as in the example quoted at the beginning. The same procedure, however, cannot be applied if the predicate of the underlying sentence is in the precative: a sentence like

bītam līpuš "let him build the house"

cannot be nominalized by means of a relative clause because

bītum ša *līpušu "the house which he ought to build"

is impossible in Akkadian, as there is no subjunctive of the precative. The question then is: can a sentence with the precative[2] be nominalized, and if so, how? I wish to suggest here that the answer is in the affirmative, and that the device used in Akkadian consists in inflecting the infinitive in the genitive after a noun in the construct state, or after the determinative pronoun *ša*. Continuing with the paradigmatic example introduced above,

bītam līpuš "let him build the house"

is regularly nominalized in Akkadian as

bītum ša epēšim "the house which he ought to build".

As is well known, the precative exhibits various shades of meaning, from command ("let him. . ."), to wish ("may he. . .") and to potentiality especially in interrogatives ("he could. . . .").[3]

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[1] A similar procedure is also found in J. Aro, "Die akkadischen Infinitivkonstruktionen", *Studia Orientalia* XXVI (1961), §2.35, p. 41 (abbreviated henceforth as Aro), for a construction which will be studied below in this article, namely *erṣet lā tāri* "the land of no returning": this he equates with *ištu erṣeti ul iturrū* "one will not return from the land".

[2] I refer here only to the precative for brevity's sake, but in effect the formula proposed applies to all moods of command, both positive and negative, i.e. in addition to the precative, also the cohortative, imperative, vetitive and prohibitive. Note that even though the prohibitive uses the indicative (type *lā teppeš* "do not build!"), nominalization by means of a relative clause would be ambiguous (at least in Babylonian) since *lā* + subjunctive is used for a statement. Hence: *bītum ša lā teppešu* "a house you will not build", but *bītum ša lā epēšika* "a house you ought not to build". For the combination of all moods of command into one paradigm see E. Reiner, *A Linguistic Analysis of Akkadian* (The Hague, 1966), 5.4.2.4.

[3] Cf. *GAG* §153 g; *AHw* 559 A 1 d. The potential value of the precative is found normally in interrogative, but occasionally also in affirmative, sentences; cf. *AHw* 559 A 1 f, and the formula *lītir limṭi* "it could be more, it could be less", *passim* in OB, *CAD* A/2 488. Also potential in nature may be considered the concessive usage of the precative, cf. *GAG* §158 c; *AHw* 559 A 1 e, e.g. *pūḫātim liddinūnikkim ul damiq* "they could give you a substi-

Accordingly, the meaning of the correlative noun phrase will also vary within a considerable range: in addition to a translation of the type "which he ought to..." (corresponding to the expression of command), there will be translations such as "which he should..." (wish) and "which he might..." (potential). In general, to arrive at a choice among the various possibilities one can try to understand the nominal constructions in terms of one of three underlying sentences. In the first case, there is an implicit command on the part of the speaker to the effect that the subject has to perform a certain action, e.g.

ša epēšim "which he ought to build"

~ *līpuš* "let him build"

~ *epēšam aqabbīšum*[1] "I order him to build".

For expression of wish also there is implicit the point of view of the speaker, who in this case formulates precisely a wish, rather than a command, that an action be performed:

ša epēšim "which he should build"

~ *līpuš* "may he build"

~ *(epēšam errissu)*[2] "I wish that he builds", "I want him to build".

In the third alternative, the potential, there is no implicit participation of the speaker, but simply a statement that the subject will – if he can, if he wants, or generally if some condition is met – perform a certain action:

ša epēšim "which he could build"

~ *līpuš* "he could build"

~ *šumma...ippeš* "he will build if...".

An alternative finite form to express the potential in Akkadian besides the precative is with the present and the enclitic *-man* (*-min* in Old Assyrian) appended to any part of the sentence:

ippešman[3] "he could build".

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tute, but to no avail" *ABPh* 40: 14–16 (OB). Cf. also the rare combination of precative and enclitic *-man* to express potential, *GAG* §170 h.

[1] For various examples of constructions of this type see Aro, 3.10, 3.64, etc.

[2] Normally with a verb of wish the subject of the main verb is the same as the subject of the subordinate clause, e.g. *šāmam ḫašeḫ* "he wishes to buy" *LE* A iii 24 = B iii 8 (OB). For a rare example in which the subjects are different see *atā turra ša ṭābāti*[1] *irrišūka* "why do they ask that you return a favour?" *ABL* 291 Rev. 3–4 = Aro, 3.102 (NB). The paradigmatic sentence in the text is built on this example; the parenthesis in the text is meant to indicate that the type is rare (even when the subjects are the same) and that the synthetic form (the precative) is in fact the regular Akkadian construction instead of the periphrastic form.

[3] For constructions of this type cf. *GAG* §152 d; *AHw* 601, 654 f.

(If the implicit condition is conceived as unrealizable at the same time it is posited, we have the so-called "irrealis" which is formally differentiated in Akkadian by means of the enclitic -*man*, or -*min* in Old Assyrian, and the verb in the preterite:

ipušman[1] "he could have built (if he wanted, but he didn't)". If the condition is unrealizable, and the main action is desired by the speaker, Akkadian uses *lūman* with the present or *lū* with the preterite:

lūman ippeš[2] "oh, could he build!"
lū īpuš[3] "he should have built".

Note also that the potential is different from a positive statement concerning the actual ability of the subject to perform a certain action, without reference to limiting conditions of sort; such a positive statement is expressed in Akkadian by the verb *le'û* "to be able to" construed with the accusative of the infinitive:

epēšam ile"i[4] "he is able to build".)

It appears clearly from the correspondences listed above that there is an inherent ambiguity in the system, because the same formal devices are used to express different shades of meaning. On the range and effect of this ambiguity we will return briefly in the last section of the present article. Here it should be stressed, as a limitation to my own reasoning, that my analysis is based not on formal, but on notional or contextual considerations: the precise meaning of a clause like *ša epēšim*, no less than that of a sentence like *līpuš*, can be gauged only from the connections which either one of them has with the rest of the discourse. The classification which follows is therefore based not on formal, but merely on notional, criteria.

We will now see, then, how the proposed interpretation of the infinitive after noun or pronoun serves to a better understanding of several textual passages, even though their general meaning is normally clear.[5] The research is based on the extensive collection of data to be found in the work by Jussi Aro on the Akkadian

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[1] For constructions of this type cf. the references in the preceding note.
[2] For constructions of this type cf. *GAG* §154 e; *AHw* 563.
[3] For constructions of this type cf. *GAG* (and *GAG²*) §152 f; *AHw* 559 A 6.
[4] For constructions of this type cf. Aro, 3.14, 3.69, etc.
[5] In fact, current translations often render the form with the infinitive precisely as if it were a subordinate clause with a precative, see for instance Aro, 2.39, who translates a model phrase *ša epēšim* as "was zu tun ist, was getan werden muß/kann/darf".

infinitive.[1] He has gathered some 470 pertinent examples from all dialects and periods – a corpus which provides a safe basis for interpretative elaborations. Only a few of the most indicative passages will be quoted here. In the listing of the examples I will indicate the role which the noun in the construct state, or respectively the determinative pronoun, has in the correlative finite sentence. Thus in

> *bītum ša epēšim* "the house he ought to build"

the determinative pronoun corresponds to the object of a sentence

> *bītam līpuš* "let him build a house",

hence the construction will be labelled: construct as object. Similarly

> *bīt erēbim* "the house he should enter"

will be labelled: construct as complement, because in

> *ana bītim līrub* "let him enter the house"

the noun *bītim* is part of the complement of place. Paronomastic and negative constructions will also be expressly indicated.

Command

Construct as object:

> *Milik būlim bēlī limlik, šumma ša šūburim ana kašīm, annītam lā annītam bēlī lišpuram* (OB)[2] "Let my lord decide about the cattle, let my lord tell me one thing or the other, whether it ought to be brought over to the steppe";

the correlative finite sentence is an advice (*milkum*) from the lord to his servant, i.e. to the writer of this letter: the advice will be either positive (*līšebir*, "let the servant bring over the cattle") or negative (*ayyīšebir*, "let him not...").

Construct as object, paronomastic infinitive:

> *Ša šitūlim lištāl* (OB)[3] "Let him ask what he ought to ask", "let him ask what he must".

Aro considers this and a few other phrases as peculiar,[4] but they

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[1] Aro, pp. 30–67. The important review by K. Deller, *Or.* N.S. XXXI (1962), 225–35 adds several NA examples. See also the earlier work by O. Ravn, *The So-Called Relative Clauses in Accadian or the Accadian Particle ša* (Copenhagen, 1941), pp. 9–32, with the important review by A. Goetze, *J.C.S.* I (1947), 73–80. On the determinative pronoun see recently F. A. Pennacchietti, "Studi sui pronomi determinativi semitici", *Ricerche IV* (Napoli, 1968).

[2] *ARM* V 81: 23–7 = Aro, 2.60.

[3] *Syria* XIX, 112: 17 (Mari letter) = Aro, 2.72.

[4] Aro, 2.72.

can in fact be explained within the general framework of the nominalization of the precative. The pronoun *ša* is the object of both the finite form *lištāl* and of the infinitive *šitūlim* which in fact stands for another *lištāl*, but nominalized. A good translation of the phrase with the infinitive is thus the one given by the original editor, Dossin, who understands *ša šitūlim* simply as "necessary" ("qu'il prenne les décisions nécessaires").

Construct as object, negative phrase:

Ina aš[talī š]unūti ul ša šūšē[m] (OB)[1] "Among those singers there is no one whom one should exclude",

or possibly better, given the context of the letter, with the command expressed in the second person: "whom you should exclude". In either case, our clause would constitute a special type of nominalization, i.e. it would be the predicate of a cleft sentence,[2] which in turn stands for simple: *mamman ina aštalī ayyišēṣū* "let them exclude no one among those singers", or in the second person: *mamman lā tušeṣṣi* "exclude no one...!"

Construct as complement:

Arnam kabtam ša ina aplūtim nasāḫim (OB)[3] "A serious offence because of which he ought to be removed from the inheritance";

here, as often in similar sentences, there is a consecutive sense which can be rendered more explicitly in English as: "so serious an offence that he ought to be disinherited". The correlative finite sentence would be: *ina aplūtim lissuḫšu* "let (the father) disinherit him!"

Adān kaspim šaqālim iktašdanni (OB)[4] "The time in which I ought to pay the silver has arrived for me."

An equally good English translation would preserve the use of the noun phrase for nominalization: "the date for the payment of the silver"; but the point being made here is that the Akkadian formulation contains an element of pressure and command which corresponds to the use of a mood of command in a correlative finite sentence (here it would be the cohortative: *lušqul* "I ought to pay"). Note that English "the date for the payment of the silver" would also be the translation of a different

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[1] *ARM* I 83: 10–11 = Aro, 2.60.

[2] On the term and the notion applied to an ancient Near Eastern language see H. J. Polotsky, "Nominalsatz und Cleft Sentence im Koptischen", *Or.* N.S. XXXI (1962), 413–30; for Akkadian see a forthcoming article by the writer, "Of Emphasis in Akkadian".

[3] *CH* Rev. xii 18–20 = Aro, 2.77.

[4] *VAB* VI 217: 7–8 = Aro, 2.5.

Akkadian noun phrase, namely *adānum ana kaspim šaqālim*.[1] The first translation given here is especially meaningful if one looks at the general context: the sender of the letter has a deadline to meet for the payment of a debt, and tries in turn to collect a certain amount of silver from a debtor of his. Hence the reference to the deadline is not in terms of a statement concerning the future ("the time in which I will pay", i.e. *adānum ša ašaqqalu*) but precisely in terms of an obligation which he is forced to meet ("the time when I ought to pay").

Ša ṭarādiya. . .idb[ub]ū (OB)[2] "They said that by which one should send me," "they say that I should be sent";

i.e. they say *liṭrudūšu* "let one send him!"

Ša duppuriyama ina ḫa⟨ẓ⟩annūtim kalūma idabbub (OB)[3] "Absolutely everyone says that by which one should totally expel me from the office of mayor", "they say that I should be expelled";

i.e. they say: *lidappirūšu* "let one expel him!"

Construct as subject, negative phrase:

Nīnuma ul ša arādi (SB)[4] "We are such that we may not go down":

this too can be understood as a type of cleft sentence for a simple sentence with the prohibitive: *lā nurrad* "we must not go down!" The use of the cleft sentence, and the corresponding nominalization of the prohibitive, appears in much clearer light if we consider the context. We are at the beginning of the poem of Nergal and Ereshkigal, and in the words of Anu the text wishes to juxtapose the *dei superi* with the *dei inferi*; hence a special emphasis is placed on the subjects in the descriptions of the two groups. The "you" of Ereshkigal is opposed emphatically to the "we" of Anu and the celestial gods, and the result is a sequence of two cleft sentences: *att[im]a ul ša elī*[5] "*you* are such that you cannot come up, and *we* are such that we cannot come down". Obviously this formulation obtains a stronger effect than a corresponding sequence of two prohibitive sentences: *attima lā tellī, nīnuma lā nurrad* "you must not come up, we must not come down".

[1] See for instance *ḫedānam ana alāk ṣābim* "a deadline for the coming of the troops" *ARM* I 43: 10. On the contrast between the two constructions see below, pp. 23–7.

[2] *ARM* II 137: 20–2 = Aro, 2.44.

[3] *ARM* II 137: 34–5 = Aro, 2.44.

[4] *STT* I 28 (*An. St.* 10, p. 110) I 33' = Aro, 2.64.

[5] *STT* I 28 (*An. St.* 10, p. 110) I 31'.

Wish

Construct as complement:

Gabaraḫ ḫalāqišu (OB)[1] "A revolt as a consequence of which he may end up in ruin", "which may bring about his ruin": a resolution of the infinitive as a finite form *liḫliq* "may he end up in ruin" is particularly fitting in this context of the Code where Hammurapi registers his curses against whoever may damage his stela, and hence uses frequently the precative.

Ša ṣibūtim šuāti leqēm epuš (OB)[2] "Do that by which you may obtain this wish",

which can be understood consecutively as "act so that you may fulfil this wish"; one may compare the sentence *ṣibūtī lukšud*[3] "may I attain my wish!"

Isimmān kezrētim, ša adi Bābilim kašādim, šurkibam (OB)[4] "Load on the boat the provisions for the hierodules, with which they may arrive as far as Babylon", "...enough provisions that they may arrive..."

Namburbi...lumun ittišu šūtuqi (SB)[5] "A namburbi rite...by means of which one may put off its evil omen."

Construct as complement, negative clause:

[Nam]burbi lumun ṣēri...ana awīlim...lā ṭeḫē (SB)[6] "A namburbi rite by means of which the evil of a snake may not approach a man."

Ana bīti ašar lā aṣē lišēribūšu (SB)[7] "Let them take him to a house from which he may not come out."

Potential

Construct as object:

Ṣeḫram ša šapārim tīšu (OB)[8] "You have a boy whom you could send."

The precative does not have a form for the second person (for command and wish the imperative is used instead), but an analogous periphrastic form is constituted by *lū* and the present;[9] hence the equivalent finite sentence for the clause with the infinitive given above could probably be reconstructed as *lū tašappar* "you could send".

1 *CH* Rev. xxvi 60–1 = Aro, 2.30. 2 *VS* xvi 109: 12–14 = Aro, 2.43.
3 *ABPh* 115: 21. 4 *VAB* vi 2: 17–19 = Aro, 2.76.
5 *KAR* 72: Obv. 1–2 = Aro, 2.23.
6 *Or.* N.S. xxxvi p. 21: 1–2, cf. Aro, 2.21. 7 *CT* xvii 35: 51 = Aro, 2.37.
8 *OECT* iii 67 (= *AbB* iv 145) 17–18 = Aro, 2.76.
9 *GAG* §81 e; *AHw* 559 2.

Ṣuḫāram ša takālim lā īšu (OA)[1] "I do not have a boy whom I could trust."

Construct as object, paronomastic infinitive:

Ṣābam ša ṭarādim abī liṭrud (OB)[2] "Let my father send the troops which he may be able to send"; a more concise translation would utilize an adjective:[3] "let my father send (all) available troops".

This translation retains the nuance of potentiality which is inherent in the construction with the infinitive better than a translation ". . . all the troops he can" (which properly would be in Akkadian: *ša ṭarādam ile''ū*);[4] in practice, however, the latter translation may often be the best when Akkadian uses a construction with the infinitive.

Ṣēnam ša paqādim piqdanni (OB)[5] "Entrust me the sheep which you may be able to entrust", "give me the available sheep".

Ša laqā'e alaqqi (OA)[6] "I will take what I may be able to take", "what is available".

Ša kalā'im akalla (OA)[7] "I will save what I may be able to save", "I will make all possible savings".[8]

Construct as complement:

Eleppēt ebērišunū ul ibaššē (OB)[9] "There are no boats with which they could cross (the river)."

Note that a little earlier in the same letter there is a slightly different formulation of what is essentially the same concept:

eleppētum ana [ebēri]ni ul i[baššē][10] "there are no boats for our crossing", "that we may cross the river with".

Though practically synonymous, the two constructions are nevertheless different, as I shall try to elucidate below.[11]

Šumma ina bītišu ša paṭārim ibašši (OB)[12] "If in his house there is that by means of which he could be redeemed."

Ša apālišu. . .ṣabat (OB)[13] "Take that by which you may pay him", "take what you need to pay him".

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[1] *TCL* XIX 4: 22–3 = Aro, 2.87.   [2] *ARM* II 63: 28 = Aro, 2.86.

[3] On this use of English adjectives for the construction with the infinitive see below, p. 27

[4] See for instance: *ša. . .kullašu ile''ū* "(a man) who is able to hold it", *ARM* IV 16–17.   [5] *ARM* II 66: 19–20 = Aro, 2.86.

[6] *CCT* III 7a: 22–3 = Aro, 2.61.   [7] *CCT* III 12b: 6–7 = Aro, 2.72.

[8] For this interpretation see B. Landsberger, *ZA* XXXVIII, 279: "Dieser verspricht. . .so viel zu sparen, als er sparen kann."

[9] *ARM* IV 6: 17–18 = Aro, 2.19.   [10] *Loc. cit.* 10–11.

[11] See pp. 26 f.   [12] *CH* XI 20–2 = Aro, 2.42.

[13] *TCL* XVIII 147: 14–15 = Aro, 2.45.

II. NOMINALIZATION OF PRESENT–FUTURE ACTION

The use of the infinitive in the environments indicated, i.e. after a noun in the construct state and after a determinative pronoun, is not reserved to the nominalized expression of command, wish or potentiality – the three verbal moods which are expressed in a finite form by a single mood, the precative. It also serves for the nominalized expression of a statement of present–future action – which is expressed in a finite form by a specific tense, the present indicative or subjunctive. Following the scheme utilized above, we may say that

bītum ša epēšim

can also serve as the nominalized equivalent of

bītam ippeš "he builds/will build a house".

As a result, then, there are two nominalized constructions which can be placed side by side,

bītum ša epēšim ⎱
bītum ša ippešu ⎰ "the house which he builds",

and the question is whether the two constructions are wholly synonymous, or whether there is a difference in meaning. In my judgement, the evidence is normally in favour of the second alternative, but for a few exceptions where both forms seem indeed to be equivalent. We shall start by considering the differences.

The most distinctive one is that nominalization with the infinitive is clearly preferred when the action of the verb is considered as generic. The meaning of the term "generic" may best be explained with some examples. Thus the clause

šammi dāmi parāsi (SB)[1] "the plant with which one stops blood" is different from

šammu ša dāma iparrasu "the plant with which he stops the blood"

because the latter envisages a specific situation, or at least a specific subject, whereas the former has no reference to specific subjects or situations, and simply states the quality of the plant almost outside of time. In translation, this aspect of atemporality is often best rendered, when one wishes to use a finite verb, by introducing an adverb such as "normally" or the auxiliary "can":

waraḫ arād Gibil (SB)[2] "the month in which the fire god normally descends";

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[1] CT XIV 36, 79-7-8, 22: Rev. 3 = Aro, 2.22.
[2] Lyon, Keilschrifttexte Sargons (Leipzig, 1883), pp. 10, 36: 61 = Aro, 2.31.

šammi dāmi parāsi (SB) "the plant with which one can stop blood".

Note that the latter is different from potentiality in that the quality of the plant (in our example) is considered capable of its effect without emphasizing possible limitations such as the wish of the subject ("with which one could stop blood, if desired"). The difference between generic action and potentiality would probably be expressed by specifying the subject in the latter. Thus to the clause:

ašar lā amāri "a place one (can) not (normally) see"

one would oppose the clause:

ašar lā amārišu "a place he (could) not see (if he wanted)".

In turn, both would be different from a clause

ašar lā immaru "a place which he does not see"

because the latter simply gives a statement, without potential or generic nuances, about both a specific situation and a specific subject.

The construction corresponding to generic action is used frequently, with an almost gnomic value, in formulaic expressions, from frozen and stereotyped phrases such as

aban erē (SB)[1] "stone (amulet) through which one can become pregnant"

to more original formulations such as

namṣaru ẓaqtu ša epēš tāḫaẓi (SB)[2] "a sharp sword with which one can give battle".

Especially common is this usage of the construction with negative particles, e.g.

qabal lā maḫārim (OB)[3] "a battle one cannot withstand";

ašar lā amāri (SB)[4] "a place which cannot be found".

An instance of nominalization of generic action may also be seen, perhaps, in constructions with a deverbal noun instead of an infinitive. See for instance:

ša dimmati (SB)[5] "the one of moaning", "the one who normally moans", "the moaner";

ūmū buqūmim (OB)[6] "the days in which one can pluck (th· wool)".

It is difficult, however, to distinguish between examples where

[1] *CAD* E 325 = Aro, 2.20.

[2] Streck, *Assurbanipal*, *VAB* VII 116: 56 = Aro, 2.82.

[3] *CH* iii 71–2 = Aro, 2.36.

[4] Several examples of this and other similar formulas listed in Aro, 2.37–8. [5] *CAD* D 143.

[6] *ARM* II 140: 27; apparently taken as an infinitive D by Aro, 2.5.

the noun has preserved the function of a true deverbal through which the action of the verb comes to the fore (as presumably with *dimmatu* and *buqūmum*), and other examples where the noun has acquired a lexicalized, i.e. more specific, meaning. The latter is certainly the case, for instance, in

mār šipri "the son of the mission", "the messenger" (rather that "the son whom one can send");

eqel ilki "the field of the *ilku*-duty" (rather than "the field in which one goes").

Clear examples of a "specific" present corresponding to the construction with the infinitive, and which could be opposed to the "generic" present just discussed, seem to be very few. As one such case one may cite:

ṭēm alākiki šuprimma luḫdu (OB)[1] "send me news about your coming that I may rejoice".

Here the infinitive cannot be interpreted as corresponding to a generic present ("that you normally come"), nor to a command ("that you ought to come"), nor to a conditional ("that you might come"). It can be explained only as corresponding to a precise and specific statement in the present or better in the future: "that you will (in fact) come". But examples of this type are indeed rare; normally one would find a subordinate clause with a finite verb in the subjunctive, such as:

kīma tallakam šuprim "write that you will come".

What remains to be seen are ambiguous cases, in which more than one meaning may obtain. First, there are instances in which the ambiguity which is formally inherent in the construction appears to be intentionally put to use to achieve a certain stylistic effect. The speaker expresses, as it were, both nuances at the same time, the nuance of wish/command and that of a statement. One can consider for example the following passage which is part of a series of curses appended by Ḫammurapi to his code:

šīram limnam ša...ḫalāq mātišu liškunšum (OB)[2] "may (DN) provide him with a bad omen through which his land will go/may go to ruin":

the ruin of the land can be envisaged as both a desire on the part of the speaker, i.e. Ḫammurapi (*liḫliq* "may he go to ruin"), and a generic statement describing the nature of the curse through the effects which normally ensue from it (*iḫalliq* "one goes to ruin").

Second, there are instances in which the ambiguity is perhaps

only apparent because it seems in fact better to assume that the speaker wanted to convey a univocal meaning. In the following sentence

ša qabīšu epuš (OB),[1]

a translation "do what he says" appears at face value to be the most logical and simple. In so doing we take the construction with the infinitive as wholly equivalent to one with a finite verb – we would not distinguish, in other words, between *ša qabīšu* and *ša iqabbū*. If, on the other hand, we consider the two clauses as a syntactical minimal pair, and try to see a difference between the two, we may wish to see in *ša qabīšu* a potential value. We would then translate:

ša qabīšu "what he might decide",

a formulation which leaves open the possibility that no decision be taken; while on the other hand

ša iqabbū "what he will decide"

implies that a decision will in any case be taken, and thus expresses a greater determination on the part of the speaker. This interpretation is perhaps supported by the fact that occasionally the expression with the infinitive is accompanied by an explicit reference to a possible alternative, e.g.:

annītam lā annītam bēlī lišpuram; ša qabē bēlīya lūpuš (OB)[2] "let my lord write to me one (decision) or the other; what(ever) my lord might decide, I will do".

Shortly afterwards, in the same letter, the writer repeats the same alternative, and then restates his expression of loyalty, but using this time a finite verbal form, as if to lift any uncertainty about the fact that the lord will, in fact, send a decision:

ša bēlī iqabbū lūpuš (OB)[3] "what my lord will say, I will do".

III. NOMINALIZATION OF PAST ACTION
AND OF CONDITION

There are two significant limitations in the corpus gathered by Aro: the infinitive after noun or pronoun is used only rarely, and then under special circumstances, for the nominalization of either past action or condition. Following our scheme, the phrase

bītum ša epēšim

does not normally have the meaning "the house which he built", serving, that is, as the nominalization of a sentence

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[1] *ARM* VI 26: Rev. 4' = Aro, 2.69.
[2] *ARM* II 29: Rev. 3'–4', cf. Aro, 2.69.   [3] *ARM* II 29: Rev. 7'.

bītam īpuš "he built a house",

nor does

bītum ša damāqim

occur with the meaning "the house which is good" as the nominalization of

bītum damiq "the house is good".

There are, to be sure, exceptions to these general statements, but they are few, and often susceptible of a special interpretation.

To begin with the verbs of condition, it should be noted that properly they express condition only in the stative; when, on the other hand, they occur as finite verbal forms, they acquire an ingressive meaning and thus are no longer to be considered verbs of condition, at least *qua* finite forms. The verbs of condition which occur in the infinitive after noun or pronoun are few in number. Among the most frequent are such verbs as *ḫadū* "to be/become happy" and *ḫamāṭu* "to be quick/to act quickly". For both verbs, the dictionaries show that finite verbal forms (with ingressive meaning) are much more common than statives (expressing condition). It seems plausible therefore that an ingressive meaning should also be preferred for the construction with infinitive after noun or pronoun. Accordingly, a phrase like

awāt ḫadēka (OB)[1]

is more likely to mean properly "the words by which you may rejoice" rather than "the words by which you are happy". Note, in favour of this interpretation, the comparison between

ṭēmum annūm ša ḫ[adī]ya (OB)[2] "this information is such that I rejoice"

and

ṭēm alākiki šuprimma luḫdu (OB)[3] "send me information that you will come, that I may rejoice":

in the second example the cohortative *luḫdu*, in coordination with *-ma* (virtual subordination), seems to have the same meaning as the nominalization with the infinitive in the first example. Similar is the case for *ḫamāṭu* as in the following example:

ṭēmum šū ša ḫamāṭim (OB)[4] "this information is such that it ought to arrive quickly",

a cleft sentence for simpler

ṭēmum šū liḫmuṭ "let this information arrive quickly".

Instead of the construction with the infinitive, nominalization

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[1] *VS* XVI 57: 36 = Aro, 2.12.   [2] *ARM* IV 29: 32 = Aro, 2.67.
[3] *VAB* VI 160: 13–15 = Aro, 2.11.   [4] *ARM* VI 53: 7 = Aro, 2.67.

for verbs of condition is common with other deverbal nouns, such as those based on the patterns *pirs* or *purs* (e.g. *dumqu*), or the feminine of the adjective (*damiqtu*), or a formation with the abstract afformative -*ūt*- (*dannūtu*). In all these cases a stative meaning for the underlying sentence seems proper. Thus while the infinitives *damāqu* or *danānu*[1] do not occur after noun or pronoun (though not impossible: *awāt damāqi* would mean "words by which one becomes good"), other expressions quite common are, e.g.:

amāt damiqtim[2] "a word which is good", "a good word";
idāt dumqi[3] "a sign which is good", "a good sign";
āl dannūti[4] "a city which is strong", "a strong city".

Nominalization by means of a deverbal noun in the genitive also occurs for roots which easily admit finite forms with an ingressive value, such as *ḫadū* and *ḫamāṭu*, for which we have already seen attested the use of the infinitive in the genitive; for deverbal nouns from these roots see for example:

in būnišu ša ḫidūtim (OB)[5] "with his countenance which is joyful";
narkabtu ša ḫamuttim (OB)[6] "a chariot which is fast".

In addition, of course, and even more frequently than with a deverbal noun in the genitive (attributive genitive), nominalization with a verb of condition is obtained by means of the formation which is most characteristic of the attribute of condition, namely the verbal adjective, e.g.

awātum damiqtum[7] "the good word".

Incidentally it may be noted that, depending on the context, nominalization of a verb of condition through the use of a deverbal noun may also refer to condition projected in the past, e.g.

warkat m[ītū]iya ū balṭūtīya ul taprusī (OB)[8] "you did not check whether I was dead or alive".

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[1] The occurrence in a lexical text of the clause *marārum ša danāni* "to be bitter (in the sense) of to be strong" (*CAD* D 83) represents obviously a special case with a technical, lexicalized meaning, and is only superficially similar to the cases we are considering here.   [2] *CAD* D 65.

[3] *CAD* D 181. Note the interesting contrast between deverbal noun for a verb of condition and infinitive for a verb of action in the same context: *idāt dumqi ša leqē kiššūti* "a good sign (signifying) that I would attain universal rule".   [4] *CAD* D 100.

[5] *YOS* IX 35 i 28.   [6] *ARM* VII 161: 16, a list of objects.

[7] *CAD* D 69. For the difference between nominalization by means of an adjective and an attributive genitive, see below, pp. 28 f.   [8] *AbB* I 53: 8–10.

The second limitation apparent in Aro's corpus is with respect to past action. Clear examples in which the infinitive after noun or pronoun is used as nominalization for past action are rare, and from late periods, e.g.:

šipirti epēš ardūti ša PN *arḫiš ina pān šarri lū takšuda* (NA)[1] "the news that PN has submitted should arrive quickly in front of the king".

In the other cases (and these too are few) in which infinitive after noun or pronoun refers to the past, a special nuance is present, whereby the construction serves to express either posteriority in the past, or command, or wish, or potentiality. Some examples follow.

Posteriority in the past

Construct as complement:

Mār šiprišu ša epēš ardūti u našē bilti. . .išpura (SB)[2] "He sent his messenger (with promises) according to which he would pay homage and bring tribute."

Command referring to the past

Construct as object:

Še'am ša leqēka itbalū (OB)[3] "They took away the barley you should have received";

Construct as object, paronomastic infinitive:

Ša naqbu'im iqqebi (OA)[4] "What ought to have been said, was said";

Construct as object, paronomastic infinitive, negative clause:

Tēteršanni. . .erišti lā erēši (SB)[5] "You asked of me a question which one ought not to have asked."

This example shows more clearly than any other how the formulation with the infinitive is in fact the only one which allows, in Akkadian, the expression of a negative command in the past; for, presumably, there is no literal Akkadian rendering of an English sentence "you should not have asked". In other words, this is a case where a given linguistic feature, which from the viewpoint of meaning (deep structure) could also appear in a finite sentence, appears instead in a nominalized transform only; a similar, and more important, case is that of the

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[1] *ABL* 896: Rev. 15–17 = Aro, 2.33.

[2] Winckler, *Sargon*, Prunkinschrift 75: 152–3 = Aro, 2.83.

[3] *TCL* xvii 7: 13–14 = Aro, 2.86.   [4] *BIN* iv 79: 10′ = Aro, 2.61.

[5] *CT* xv 47 (Descent of Ishtar): Rev. 22 = Aro, 2.37.

agentive, which in Akkadian cannot be expressed after a finite passive verb, but only in a nominalized transform ("he was struck down by the wall" in Akkadian can only occur as *immaḫiṣ* "he was struck down", necessarily omitting the reference to the agent; but the nominalization *maḫṣam igārim*[1] "hit by the wall" is possible).

Construct as complement:

Aššum ṭēm ipir ṣābim watrūti (?) nadānim ša tašpurānim (OB)[2] "Concerning the notice you sent me, according to which I should pay the rations of the extra workers...";

Ša dū'ākika tēpuš (OA)[3] "You did (such a thing) for which one should have killed you."

Wish referring to the past

Construct as complement:

[I]na panītim ša lā balāṭīya [awī]lum...idbub (OB)[4] "In the past that man said (such things) by which I may not live", "spoke so that I may not survive".

Ša ekēme miṣriya išpura mār šipri (SB)[5] "He sent a messenger according to whom they should conquer my territory."

Potentiality in the past

Construct as object:

Mimma ša leqē PN ul ibši (OB)[6] "There was nothing which PN could take";

Construct as object, paronomastic infinitive:

Wardīšu ša dākim idduku (OB)[7] "They have killed (all) the servants of his they could";

Alpī u immerātim...ša mašāḫim imšuḫu (OB)[8] "They stole the oxen and sheep they could";

Construct as complement, paronomastic infinitive:

Ātanḫam ša tuārima atūram (OA)[9] "I became tired and came back in whatever manner I could", "as best I could".

As with nominalization of present action, so for past action too one can find deverbal nouns as a nominalizing device, e.g.:

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[1] Cf. von Soden, *J.N.E.S.* xix, 165.
[2] *UCP* ix, p. 364, 30: 6–7 = Aro, 2.11.
[3] *CCT* iv 9b: 24 = Aro, 2.68.
[4] *ARM* v 4: 9–10 = Aro, 2.44.
[5] Winckler, *Sargon*, Prunkinschrift 65: 31 = Aro, 2.51.
[6] *TCL* x 34: 14–15 = Aro, 2.42.   [7] *ARM* ii 74: Rev. 7′ = Aro, 2.86.
[8] *ARM* iv 80: 4–5 = Aro, 2.86.   [9] *BIN* iv 70: 15–16 = Aro, 2.72.

[*ultu*] *ūmē rūqūti ṣibit Aššur* (SB)[1] "since the remote days when Aššur had been taken...".

But even expressions of this type are rare. The conclusion then seems inescapable that the only regular type of nominalization for past action is by means of relative and subordinate clauses.

IV. SUMMARY

The cases of nominalization considered in the present article have all one feature in common, namely that in the resulting nominalized transform the predicate of the correlative finite sentence never appears as the construct, or head of the construction. This may best be explained by considering the following examples as representative of the material studied:

Finite sentence		Correlative noun phrase	
		Head	Modifier
1. *bītam ippeš* ~	{	*bīt(um*	*ša) ippešu* "the house which he builds"
	{	*bītum*	*ša epēšim* "the house of building"
2. *ana bītim irrub* ~	{	*bīt(um*	*ša) irrubu* "the house in which he enters"
	{	*bīt(um*	*ša) erēbim* "the house of entering"
3. *bītum dan* ~	{	*bītum*	*dannum* "the strong house"
	{	*bīt*	*dunnim* "the house of strength"

The terms "head" and "modifier" have been introduced to serve as uniform labels for the two constituents of the noun phrase: they refer to the morphological characteristics (surface structure) of the noun phrase, whereby "head" is the governing substantive or pronoun, and "modifier" the subjunctive, genitive or adjective which is governed by the "head". The feature, then, which is common to all cases of nominalization studied in this article is that the modifier in the noun phrase corresponds always to either the object, or the complement, or the subject of the correlative finite sentence, never to the predicate. We have not been considering, in other words, the inverse type, which is also possible and quite common, namely:

1. *bītam ippeš* ~ *epēš bītim* "the building of the house"
2. *ana bītim irrub* ~ *erēb bītim* "entering in the house"
3. *bītum dan* ~ *dunni bītim* "the strength of the house"

Here the head of the noun phrase corresponds in each case to the predicate of the correlative finite sentence. It may be noted in passing that with this type of nominalization there is no morphological device to express a correlation with a precative in the corresponding finite sentence, i.e. there is no construction similar in structure and function to

bītum ša epēšim "a house which should be built".

Instead, a new lexical item in the form of a substantive has to be introduced; for example, in the phrase

erišti bītim epēšim "the desire to build a house"[1]

the substantive in the construct state *erišti* governing the infinitive *epēšim* could be considered as the nominal equivalent of the precative in the sentence

bītam līpuš "may he build the house".

Considering now only the constructions which have been studied here, i.e. those in which the construct (or "head") corresponds to object, complement or subject of the correlative finite sentence, the following conclusions emerge (disregarding here the exceptions which have appeared to be of minor importance).

(1) A sentence expressing command, wish or potentiality (hence employing the precative or other command moods as a finite verb) is regularly nominalized as a noun phrase consisting of an infinitive after noun or pronoun, e.g. *adān šaqālim* "the time in which I ought to pay".

(2) The same type of nominalization is also used when the predicate of the correlative finite sentence refers to present-future action with generic or universal meaning, e.g. *qabal lā maḫārim* "a battle one cannot withstand".

(3) If the predicate of the correlative finite sentence is a verb of condition, the resulting noun phrase consists of either a substantive and an adjective (e.g. *šarrum dannum* "a strong king"), or a substantive and a deverbal noun (*āl dannūti* "a city of strength", "a strong city").

(4) If the predicate of the correlative finite sentence is a verb referring to a specific present–future action, or to past action, the resulting noun phrase normally consists of a relative clause, e.g. *bīt ippešu* "the house he builds" and *bīt īpušu* "the house he built".

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[1] For attested examples see, e.g., *erišti mē ḫabēm* "(divine) desire that water be drawn (for a libation)" YOS x 51 i 30 (OB omen); *ḫisiḫti kussī ṣamādim* "the wish that a chair be prepared" *VS* xvi 167: 7–8 = Aro, 2.29 (OB); on the second example see however *CAD* Ḫ 204.

Constituents of finite sentence	Finite sentence	Nominalization			
		Relative clause	Infinitive after construct or *ša*	Deverbal noun after construct or *ša*	Adjective and participle
Object; transitive predicate	*bītam īpuš* he built the house *bītam ippeš* ⎰spec. he builds the house ⎱gen. *bītam līpuš* may he build the house	*bīt(um ša) īpušu* the house he built *bīt(um ša) ippešu* the house he builds	*bītum ša epēšim** the house one can build the house he should build		*bītum epšum* the built-up house***
Complement; intransitive fientive	*ana bītim īrub* he entered the house *ana bītim irrub* ⎰spec. he enters the house ⎱gen. *ana bītim līrub* may he enter the house	*bīt(um ša) īrubu* the house he entered *bīt(um ša) irrubu* the house he enters	*bīt(um ša) erēbim* the house one can enter the house he should enter		
Subject; stative	*bītum dan* the house is strong			*bīt dunnim* the house of strength	*bītum dannum* the strong house
Subject; fientive	*bītum uballiṭ* the temple gave life *bītum uballaṭ* the temple gives life *bītum liballiṭ* may the temple give life	*bīt(um ša) uballiṭu* the temple which gave life *bīt(um ša) uballaṭu* the temple which gives life —**			*bītum muballiṭum* the life-giving temple

The various data may be tabulated in the form of a syntactical paradigm, which faces. As often in paradigms, not all constructions give good sense; but it seems useful to keep the same lexical items throughout, so as to place in better relief the variables where they occur. The first column includes indications concerning the nature of "head" and "modifier" in the correlative finite sentence, and more precisely whether the "head" corresponds to object, complement or subject, and whether the "modifier" corresponds to a transitive, intransitive fientive or intransitive stative predicate.

Some considerations are appended in notes marked by asterisks on the chart. The single asterisk (*) calls attention to the fact, already noted by Aro,[1] that the infinitive does not occur after a noun in the construct state when this stands for the object of the correlative finite sentence; in such instances, the pronoun *ša* is always used – hence we do not find

bīt epēšim

but rather only

bītum ša epēšim

in the sense of "the house which he ought to build". The only exception, which numbers, however, many examples, is with negation, e.g.

ašar lā amāri "a place one cannot find".

The second note (**) is meant to emphasize the lack, or at least the rarity, of the construction with the infinitive when the construct corresponds to the subject of the correlative finite sentence and the verb is fientive, either transitive or intransitive. Even though in principle there seems to be nothing against a construction of the type

bīt(um ša) bulluṭi "a temple such that it ought to give life", it is in fact very seldom attested.[2] (I exclude of course the subject of a passive verb, since this is actually the equivalent of the object of a transitive verb.) For examples with and without *ša*, both with a verb of condition used ingressively, see:

ṭēmum šū ša ḫamāṭim (OB)[3] "this information is such that it ought to arrive quickly";

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[1] Aro, 2.2.

[2] It is interesting to note that while the formula *ša dū'āki anāku* "I am one whom one should kill" (construct as object) is frequent (Aro, 2.66), the semantically equivalent *ša māti anāku* "I am one who should die" (construct as subject) does not seem to be attested.

[3] *ARM* VI 53: 7 = Aro, 2.67.

ṭēm ḫamāṭim (OB)[1] "the undertaking which ought to take place quickly".

Constructions of this type are mostly used for emphasis in cleft sentences, as in the first of the two examples just quoted and in

awīlum šū ul ša balāṭim (OB)[2] "that man is not such that he should live", "he is not worthy to continue living".

Finally it should be noted that the expression *bītum epšum* (***) has actually acquired a special, lexicalized meaning of "built-on house plot"; the meaning given in the paradigm is therefore not attested as such,[3] and is simply meant to convey the basic meaning of the construction, and its connection with the correlative finite sentence on the left in the paradigm.

The distribution of the data in the preceding paradigm shows that there is relatively little ambiguity in the use of the forms. The only overlaps are between the generic present and the precative as the correlative finite forms of the infinitive after noun or pronoun. In turn, the precative itself can be interpreted as referring to command, wish or potentiality, without any differentiation in form. Such ambiguity, however, can normally be lifted on the basis of lexical and contextual considerations. These could perhaps be formalized through the analysis of the lexical features of the constituents of a sentence – a procedure, however, which would be rather complex. Intuitively, one can see at a glance that the difference in interpretation between the following two sentences is due to lexical, rather than morphological features:

ašar lā amāri "a place which *cannot* be seen",
erišti lā ērēši "a request which *should not* be made".

The English rendering introduces a formal differentiation where for Akkadian the lexical connotation of the constituents and the broader context in which they occur are sufficient. The broader context, on the other hand, remains the only criterion for a choice when Akkadian says:

ašar lā amāri

in the sense of "a place which *should not* be seen", since in this case both form and lexical connotation remain the same as when the same phrase is used in the sense of "a place which *cannot* be seen". Ambiguities of this type are common in all languages

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[1] *ARM* II 48: 21 = Aro, 2.12.

[2] *ARM* V 72: 5 = Aro, 2.67. See also *STT* I 28: i 31'.33', above p. 7.

[3] See however *bītu epšu adi gušūrēšu adi dalātišu* "a house in good repair, with its beams and its doors" *ADD* 324: 6–7 (NA) and *passim* in *ADD*, cf. *CAD* G 145.

and certainly so in Akkadian. One may think, for instance, of the multiple functions served by the genitive (the objective and subjective functions mentioned at the beginning of this article are only two among many), or the use of undifferentiated co-ordination with -*ma* for a variety of subordinating relationships (temporal, concessive, consecutive, etc.),[1] or the role played by emphatic devices, such as inversion of word order, to express in a veiled manner what the language can otherwise express in a clearer and more differentiated way.[2]

In some cases the construction with the infinitive after noun or pronoun seems equivalent to other constructions equally, or even more, frequent in the language. We will consider here only one (*ana* with the infinitive), to which reference has been made in the course of the article. Thus it has been noted that the following two pairs seem practically synonymous:

adān kaspim šaqālim iktašad "the time in which I ought to pay the silver has arrived";

adānum ana kaspim šaqālim iktašad "the time for the paying of the silver has arrived";[3]

and

eleppēt ebērišunū ul ibašśē "there are no boats with which they may cross (the river)";

eleppētum ana ebērišunū ul ibašśē "there are no boats for their crossing".[4]

Two alternatives present themselves in the analysis of the second member of each pair.

(1) In the first alternative, the prepositional phrase with *ana* and the infinitive is adnominal in character, i.e. it constitutes a single noun phrase together with the noun which precedes. In this case the correlation between the two formulations is particularly close, but they remain, none the less, different. The formulation with *ana* expresses finality, consequence, etc., but not properly or specifically obligation, wish or potentiality as is true of the infinitive after noun or pronoun. Thus in the first example the phrase

adānum ana kaspim šaqālim

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[1] See on the subject R. D. Patterson, *Old Babylonian Parataxis as Exhibited in the Royal Letters of the Middle Old Babylonian Period and in the Code of Hammurapi*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1971.

[2] On this interpretation see my forthcoming article "Of Emphasis in Akkadian". There I also deal more *in extenso* with the stylistic value of ambiguity.

[3] See above, pp. 6 f.   [4] See above, p. 9.

is best understood as the nominalization of a sentence which introduces the idea of finality, such as

> *adānum ana kaspim šaqālim iššakin*[1] "a deadline was set in order that the silver be paid".

It seems difficult that a different understanding of the phrase be possible; at any rate it does not seem possible to introduce the notion of obligation which is instead proper to

> *adān kaspim šaqālim,*

a phrase which, according to the argumentation proposed here, is to be resolved as

> *ina adānim šuāti kaspam lišqul* "he ought to pay the silver at the specified time".

Note especially that a temporal interpretation of

> *adānum ana kaspim šaqālim*

is not possible, since *ana*+infinitive does not occur in a temporal sense, though *ana*+noun does.[2] If a temporal meaning were possible, then the meaning of the two phrases in our first pair would in fact be identical: "the time in which I ought to pay the silver" and "the time when I ought to pay the silver". The interpretation in the sense of finality proposed above implies that the phrase

> *adānum ana kaspim šaqālim*

be considered elliptic for a common type of nominalization with relative clause:

> *adānum (ša) ana kaspim šaqālim (iššaknu)* "the deadline (which was set in order that I pay the silver".

In point of fact, this is practically synonymous with

> *adān kaspim šaqālim* "the time in which I ought to pay the silver",

but it is important that we become aware of the real difference in structure and of the potential difference in meaning, since the latter may become relevant in a given context.

And similarly for the second pair noted. The phrase

> *eleppētum ana ebērišunū*

is best understood as elliptic for some such sentence as

> *eleppētum ša ana ebērišunū wasmā*[3] "boats which are suitable for the purpose of their crossing".

In practice, this may well be synonymous with

> *eleppēt ebērišunū* "boats with which they may cross";

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[1] For constructions with *adānum* and *šakānum* cf. *CAD A/1* 98 f.
[2] Cf. *AHw* 47 E 2; Aro, 6.1-4.
[3] For constructions with *wasāmu* and *ana* cf. *CAD A/2* 328 f.

however, the first formulation puts the stress on the quality of the boat, the second on the potentiality of the action of crossing. (The introduction of distinct lexical items such as *šakānu* in the first, and *wasāmu* in the second example is arbitrary and may seem disturbing, especially without the availability of living informants. Yet the procedure is justified if the elements deleted have an ample attestation in environments without deletion. The same procedure underlies some of the conclusions of traditional grammar; for example the term and the notion of "possessive genitive"[1] implies an understanding of a phrase such as *bīt awīlim* "the man's house" on the basis of some such sentence as *awīlum bītam īšu*[2] "the man owns the house".)

(2) The second alternative consists in taking the complement with *ana* as adverbial, rather than adnominal. In other words, the phrase *ana kaspim šaqālim* is governed directly by the predicate *iktašad*:

> *adānum ana kaspim šaqālim iktašad* "the deadline has come so that I have to pay the silver",

and the phrase *ana ebērišunū* by the predicate *ibašše*:

> *eleppētum ana ebērišunū ul ibašše* "there are no boats so that they cannot cross (the river)".

If so, the difference in meaning with respect to the construction with the infinitive after construct is more noticeable. In fact the sentence

> *eleppēt ebērišunū ul ibašše* "boats with which they may cross (the river) are not here"

stresses the potentiality and desire of crossing on the part of the subject, whereas the sentence with adverbial complement states objectively the impossibility of crossing due to the lack of means. A stronger formulation of the sentence with adverbial complement, which emphasizes the lack of means over the impossibility of crossing, is with coordination by means of *-ma* (virtual subordination):

> *eleppētum ul ibaššēma ul ibbirū* "there are no boats and thus they will not cross".

We could set up the following as a syntactical paradigm which shows the gradation of meanings from one formulation to the other:

> 1. *eleppēt ebērišunū ul ibašše* "there are no boats with which they may cross"

emphasis on potentiality and wish of crossing;

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[1] Cf. *GAG* §136a.   [2] Cf. *CAD I–J* 291.

2. *eleppētum ana ebērišunū | ul ibašše* (adnominal complement) "there are no boats suitable for their crossing"

emphasis on the type of boats (there may be boats suitable for other purposes);

3. *eleppētum | ana ebērišunū ul ibašše* (adverbial complement) "there are no boats so that they cannot cross"

emphasis on the impossibility of crossing (for lack of means);

4. *eleppētum ul ibaššēma ul ibbirū* "since there are no boats they cannot cross"

emphasis on the lack of means (which prevents the crossing).

Similarly in the sentence

adān kaspim šaqālim iktašad "the time in which I ought to pay the silver has arrived"

the adnominal complement with the infinitive defines the nature of the deadline, whereas the use of an adverbial complement in

adānum ana kaspim šaqālim iktašad "the time has come so that I must pay the silver"

stresses the need of paying as the result of a given circumstance, which, however, is not described further (of it the speaker could say by whom it was set, for when, etc.).

A choice between the two alternatives is difficult on the basis of only written documents, but it seems probable that living speech differentiated between the two by means of pauses and intonation:

eleppētum͡ ana͡ ebērišunū | ul ibašše (adnominal complement)
eleppētum | ana ebērišunū | ul ibašše (adverbial complement).

There are in the language two other devices which, when used, remove the ambiguity otherwise inherent in the writing system, namely word order and the determinative pronoun *ša*:[1]

eleppētum ša ana ebērišunū ul ibašše (adnominal)
ana ebērišunū eleppētum ul ibašše (adverbial).

When neither one is used, the ambiguity seems insurmountable for the reader of a written text, unless the context is sufficient as a clue. Because of the existence of formally defined adnominal complements (types *eleppēt ebērišunū, eleppētum ša ana ebērišunū*) I would tend to think that when these devices are not used, and

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[1] The latter device has also been pointed out by J. Aro, "Präpositionale Verbindungen als Bestimmungen des Nomens im Akkadischen", *Or.* N.S. XXXII (1963), 402. He also mentions word order, pp. 399–401, but only in connection with partitives, where inversion can occur even within the noun phrase.

the context gives no clue, we have in fact an adverbial complement;[1] I would like in other words to read normally:

eleppētum | ana ebērišunū | ul ibaššē.

But the basis for such hypothesis is admittedly very small. In concrete cases, a choice between the two alternatives may not always be necessary, since the nuances which I have tried to elucidate may in most cases have but a minimal influence on the meaning. In any case, what mattered here was to describe various structures which are in fact formally different.

A good reason for the productivity and specialization of the construction with infinitive after noun or pronoun is, as we have seen, the impossibility of using the precative in a relative or subordinate clause: a phrase like *bītum ša *līpušu* is in fact impossible. But there is another reason for the productivity of the type *ša epēšim*, and this is the lack, in Akkadian, of gerundive adjectives. Akkadian is generally poor in adjectival formations, whether derived through internal (type *paris, purrus*) or external inflection (type *-ān-, -ī-*); and none of these formations expresses the command, wish, potentiality or possibility that a certain action be performed. There is no equivalent, in other words, of such formations as English *-able* (e.g. in "acceptable") or Latin *-end-* (e.g. *delendum* "to be destroyed") – no equivalent, that is, other than precisely the periphrastic construction with infinitive after noun or pronoun. Thus

ṣuhāram ša takālim lā īšu (OA)[2] "I do not have a boy whom I could trust"

can equally well be translated as "I do not have a trust*worthy* boy" (though indirectly a "trusted" boy, Akkadian *taklum*, can also be considered "trustworthy", since experience in the past is taken as a warranty of future performance); or again:

šarrūt la šanān (SB)[3] "a reign which cannot be duplicated", "an incompar*able* reign".

In effect, many of Aro's translations in his book on the infinitive use precisely adjectives of the type mentioned, and quite properly so, e.g.:

⌜*ša*⌝ *abākim* (OA)[4] "hin*zu*schaff*end*";
ša lā akāli (SB)[5] "uneß*bar*";
ša lā nakār (SB)[6] "unabänder*lich*".

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[1] Also to Aro, "Verbindungen", quoted, p. 402, this seems a tempting hypothesis.   [2] *TCL* xix 4: 22–3 = Aro, 2.87.
[3] See several examples in Aro, 2.38.   [4] *BIN* vi 109: 29 = Aro, 2.87.
[5] iv R 63 iii 41 = Aro, 2.92.
[6] iv R 62 Rev. No. 2: 45 = Aro, 2.96. See also above, p. 9.

It may be noted in this connection that a similar function is also served by the "attributive" genitive of the type *āl dannūti*. This type is practically the only one available in the language when the "modifier" is a noun derived from a nominal, rather than a verbal root – for in this case the adjective cannot be derived by means of normal patterns through internal inflection. For example, the noun *ilum* "god", being a nominal root, does not admit of adjectives derived through internal inflection (such as *paris*). There is, it is true, an adjective derived through external afformatives, *ilānū* (i.e. *il-ān-ī-u*), but this is rare and with a special, lexicalized meaning, "prosperous, lucky". Hence the normal way of expressing an adjectival relationship is by means of the abstract noun appended as a genitive, e.g. *šubat ilūti*[1] "divine abode". The same construction is also found when a regular adjective is available through internal inflection, as with *āl dannūti* "strong city" next to which we find *šarrum dannum* "strong king". The difference between the two constructions is not immediately clear. As a hypothesis one may suggest the following distinction. The type *šarrum dannum* corresponds to a finite sentence in which the head (*šarrum*) appears as the subject and the modifier (*dannum*) as the predicate, i.e. *šarrum dan* "the king is strong". The type *āl dannūti*, on the other hand, corresponds to a finite sentence in which the head (*ālum*) appears as a complement, and the modifier (*dannūti*) as any other element of the sentence – in our case, also the predicate: *ina alim dannū* "in the city they are strong". If so, then *āl dannūti* would properly mean "the city in which one is strong, one feels secure" (and *ālum dannum* "the fortified city"). Similarly with other roots:

> *awātum damiqtum*[2] "a good word", "a good thing"
> vs. *šīr dumqi*[3] "an omen *according to which* a good thing (will happen)";
> *šarrum kīnum*[4] "true, legitimate king"
> vs. *dayyān kitti[m]*[5] "a judge *through whom* justice (takes place)";
> *awīlum ḫadū*[6] "a happy man"
> vs. ⌜*ūm ḫidūti*⌝[7] "a day *in which* one is happy".

[1] *CAD* I-J 105.　　　　[2] E.g. *YOS* x 47: 7 (OB).
[3] *CT* xxxiv 31 ii 56 (NB), and often with words for omen, *CAD* D 181.
[4] *TCL* iii 114 (SB, Sargon).
[5] *VAB* vi 218: 27 (OB).
[6] Oppenheim, *Dreambook*, p. 313: ix x+6 (SB).
[7] *KAR* 177 Rev. ii 41 (SB).

Needless to say, in English, which is much more liberal in the use of adjectives than Akkadian, we would translate on most occasions with an adjective, not word by word with a substantive: "a good omen" (not "an omen of goodness"); "a just judge" (not "a judge of justice"); "a happy day" (here also possibly "a day of happiness"). The genitives from nominal roots also fall in this category: in fact the type discussed above, *šubat ilūti*, does not mean "the dwelling is god", but rather "an abode *in which* god dwells", hence, in English, "a divine abode". And similarly, with another primary noun:

ṭabtu...ša abbūti[1] "goodness which is proper for a father", hence, in good English, "fatherly goodness".

How far these considerations would apply I cannot say without a thorough analysis of the evidence. But this type of nominalization is essentially different from the one with which we have been concerned in this article – properly only the nominalization with the infinitive in the genitive – and thus can be left aside for another study.

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[1] *CT* xxii N. 43: 23–4 (NB).

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